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KIERKEGAARD AND EXISTENCE 
COMMUNICA TIONS 
John H. Whittaker 
Kierkegaard occasionally mentions a type of belief which he calls an "existence communi-
cation," and his discussion of such beliefs parallels his discussion of subjective truths (in 
the Concluding Unscientific Postscript). Existence communications include religious 
beliefs. I suggest that it is less misleading to focus on this term than it is to wrestle with 
the difficult and overworked notion of subjective truths; ultimately, his view of religious 
beliefs can be seen more clearly. 
His view does not fully emerge, however, without the assistance of some other concepts. 
My thesis is that existence communications are comparable in their resistance to objective 
fOnTIS of adjudication to first principles, and comparable in their "self-involving" charac-
teristics to teleological principles about the "raison d'etre of existence. 
This account not only helps to clarify Kierkegaard's discussion, but it also offers two 
important hints about modern problems regarding religious belief. It suggest that religious 
claims may indeed be truth claims, and it suggests that there is more to the justification 
than comes out in a consideration of evidence. 
One of the most puzzling things that Kierkegaard ever said was that "subjectivity is 
truth." The chapter on this dark idea in the Concluding Unscientific Postscript is al-
most impossible to understand. It seems to express an idea which, if not obviously 
false, is counter-intuitive and easily criticized. For how can the passion-the 
"subjectivity"-involved in the affirmation of a belief vouch for the truth of that be-
lief? Subjectivity has to do with persons, but the truth or falsity of a belief depends on 
the way the world is; and it is hard to see how Kierkegaard could have connected 
personal characteristics with facts about the world. Yet at the same time, the idea that 
subjectivity is truth informs a whole range of insightful observations about the nature 
of religious beliefs. Religious beliefs are not tentative affirmations of hypotheses , they 
cannot be confirmed solely by "the facts," their affirmation requires decisiveness, and 
their adoption brings with it a whole new way of life-these are all genuine insights. 
And because of them, Kierkegaard's discussion of subjectivity and truth retains a 
lingering fascination for philosophers of religion, who return to this chapter in the 
Postscript time and again. Something in his thinking seems to be right; and it seems 
worthwhile to dig it up, dust it off, and hold it up to view. 
In any case, I would like to take up the question of subjective truth once again. 
But instead of beginning with the difficult ideas presented in the section of the 
FAITH AND PHILOSOPHY 
Vol. 5 No.2 April 1988 
All rights reserved. 
168 
EXISTENCE COMMUNICATIONS 169 
Postscript entitled ''Truth is Subjectivity," I would like to begin elsewhere. The 
starting point that I have in mind is Kierkegaard's discussion of "existence 
communications," a term which he uses to describe religious beliefs in the latter 
portion of the Postscript. In some ways, this later discussion of religious beliefs 
is just as complicated as his earlier discussion. Many of the same concepts-
dialectical pathos, historical and eternal truths, objectivity, etc.-DCcur in both 
sections. But alongside these concepts appears a new one, the notion of an 
"existence communication." And this concept, though still difficult, is plainly 
designed to convey the same thoughts which he previously discussed under the 
heading of subjective truths. Unlike the former term, however, the notion of 
existence communications does not conjure up associations with arbitrary judg-
ments, emotive expressions, private fantasies, irrational convictions, and the 
like. It should therefore afford us a fresh look at the heart of Kierkegaard's view 
of religious claims. 
(1) 
Kierkegaard introduces the term "existence communication" to help distinguish 
Christian teachings from speculative doctrines. 
"Christianity is not a doctrine but an existential communication expres-
sing an existential contradiction. If Christianity were a doctrine it would 
eo ipso not be an opposite to speculative thought, but rather a phase 
within it. Christianity has to do with existence, with the act existing; 
but existence and existing constitute precisely the opposite of specula-
tion"'. 
For the moment, we need not worry over the "existential contradiction" that 
Kierkegaard mentions in this passage: the important thing is the effort to contrast 
Christian claims with philosophical doctrines. Such doctrines are defined by the 
fact that they are "not relevant to existing"2. They are to be "intellectually grasped 
and speculatively understood," whereas existential communications are to be 
"realized in existence"'. Indeed, the only involvement of philosophy in this 
matter does not consist in understanding Christian claims as speculative hypoth-
eses but in clarifying the reasons why they cannot be so understood. Toward 
this end, Kierkegaard chooses to call Christianity an existential communication, 
"in order definitely to indicate its heterogeneity with speculation"4. 
Explaining what Kierkegaard meant by "existence communications," then, 
means explaining why he thought that Christian beliefs could not be justified as 
philosophical hypotheses. This is not an easy thing to do, especially in view of 
the fact that philosophers have for centuries tried to interpret and to defend the 
central teachings of the faith by justifying theism on speculative grounds. My 
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sympathies lie with Kierkegaard on this point; but this does not mean that I think 
Christian claims are senseless or irrational, that faith is an arbitrary affair, or 
that nothing at all can be said for Christian belief. I don't believe that Kierkegaard 
did either, but perhaps we should let him speak for himself. 
In contrasting Christian teachings and speculative doctrines Kierkegaard does 
not deny the obvious fact that Christianity is set forth in doctrinal propositions. 
Existence communications, in other words, are doctrines of a sort. The are 
beliefs, for the term "existence communication" does not refer to the act of 
communication but to the content of what is communicated, just as the term 
"belief' can be used to refer to a proposition rather than to the act of believing. 
Thus, Kierkegaard sometimes speaks of Christian doctrines, and uses this phrase 
interchangeably with "existence communications," but only when there is no 
danger of confusing Christianity with speculative theories5 • His point is to distin-
guish Christian doctrines in kind from philosophical doctrines; and though he 
does not do this very systematically, it is still possible to trace the main lines 
on which this distinction is drawn. 
He calls Christian teachings "existence communications" because they confront 
the individual with the challenge, not of interpreting Christian doctrines specula-
tively, but of existing in these beIiefs6 • They are to be "realized in existence"7. 
The "appropriation" of Christian claims is even said to be more important than 
the abstract question of their truths. Kierkegaard' s point here, which he undoub-
tedly overdramatized, is that philosophical doctrines can be believed without the 
believer determining his life "in conformity therewith"9. But religious doctrines 
must be adhered to as personal guides if they are to be believed at all. The form 
of assent which acknowledges religious truths but does not express this acknow-
ledgement in personal transformation simply is not religious belief. 
One might well interrupt here to ask what is wrong with breaking religious 
belief down into two steps: first, the justification of beliefs on philosophical 
grounds and then the adherence to them as guides for one's personal life. This 
may seem like the most prudent way to picture belief, but Kierkegaard's entire 
discussion of faith's logic is intended to show that this view distorts the nature 
of faith claims. For one cannot understand Christian claims without understanding 
them in relation to oneself; and if one foregoes this personal approach by 
attempting to construe these claims impersonally, as if they concerned only the 
world and not oneself, then he winds up with a caricature of faith. That is why 
Kierkegaard makes fun of philosophers who have three proofs for immortality 
but who do not live in the ways that one would expect this belief to entail. It is 
not simply that such philosophers do not practice what they preach; Kierkegaard's 
complaint is that immortality cannot be impersonally confirmed to begin with. 
Even Socrates knew this, for Kierkegaard credits him with doubting his own 
arguments for immortality-for saying "if' there is an immortality-and then 
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dying with remarkable courage. He did not first justify the belief in immortality 
and then abide by it; the manner of his death embodied his faith, which did not 
exist in a prior, unembodied, form, as if it had been independently confirmed 10. 
The type of thinking which belongs to speculative issues-abstract interpreta-
tion, the adducing of evidence out of reflection, the attempt to demonstrate 
comprehensiveness--does not fit the peculiar requirements of existence com-
munications. Speculative claims are "objective" assertions, which are to be 
judged dispassionately in abstraction from one's existential concerns as a concrete 
individual. Consequently, the truth or falsity of a speculative claim depends on 
evidence of some kind; for that is how the world reports its verdict about the 
truth of an objective belief-in terms of evidence. But an existence communica-
tion cannot even be understood, let alone justified, on the basis of evidence. 
The point of an existence communication only emerges in relation to one's inmost 
concerns as an individual, so that it is inevitably misunderstood if it is approached 
dispassionately in the absence of such concerns. This, though, is precisely what 
happens when existence communications are treated as philosophical doctrines 
and judged "objectively." The burden of responsibility for judging their truth is 
passed from the individual to the evidence, so that the would-be believer waits 
until the evidence becomes decisive, all the while abstracting oneself from the 
issue. This abstraction, involved in the dispassionate judgment of an existence 
communication, prevents its point from properly emerging. 
Gathering evidence of a philosophical or historical nature, therefore, is not a 
strategy that one should expect to produce Christian faith. A more fitting approach 
is to understand Christian beliefs more and more in relation to one's inward 
concerns. 
. one does not prepare oneself to become attentive to Christianity 
by reading books, or by world-historical surveys, but by immersing 
oneself deeper in existence. Every other propaedeutic must eo ipso end 
in a misunderstanding, for Christianity is [an] existence-communica-
tion ... "". 
By "immersing oneself deeper in existence," one's existential "pathos" increases, 
so that one becomes more sensitive to the meaning of one's suffering, more 
distraught over one's guilt, and more aware of the need for a contented resignation 
to finitude '2. Grasping the point of religious claims presumes this deepened 
sensitivity, without which they cannot be appreciatively understood. 
All this may become clearer if we consider Kierkegaard' s reasons for criticizing 
childish Christianity. Presumably, a child might be clever enough to understand 
the historical evidence for Christianity, to follow the logic of the "proofs" for 
God's existence, and to appreciate the force of other speculative arguments. But 
the thought that a child might believe in Christianity fills Kierkegaard with 
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contempt. A "child has no decisive use of Christianity"". A child lacks the 
sin-consciousness which develops only in maturity and which is a condition for 
Christian understandingI'. Consequently, 
"the Christianity which is taught to a child, or rather which the child 
pieces together for itself when no violence is used to force the little 
exister into the most decisive Christian determinants, is not properly 
Christianity but idyllic mythology"'5. 
Having no sin-consciousness to be relieved by the concept of grace, the child's 
belief is innocent; but it is also distorted. Here Christian claims do not serve 
their proper purpose, and the child's pointless understanding of the faith is a 
mere fantasy. Similarly, the philosopher who treats Christianity dispassionately 
as a theoretical doctrine, also misses its point. His picture of the faith is also 
distorted, and he judges something that amounts to a mythology-although it is 
called something else, such as theism, or Christian philosophy. 
Now, if it were possible to bracket one's existential concerns while judging 
Christianity dispassionately, then there would be nothing essentially wrong with 
childish belief. Then it would make sense to say, "after we have settled the truth 
of Christianity, then we can worry about our personal relation to it." And the 
only fault of the child would be that it would have to wait until some time after 
it had affirmed the truth of Christianity to give it room in a mature life. But 
again, the notion that one can separate one's affirmation of a religious teaching 
from its incorporation into the domain of inward, personalized, understanding 
is the root of the difficulty. Kierkegaard thought that such impersonal affirmations 
of Christianity (or of other religions) simply were not possible. Belief under 
such circumstances is pointless, and the pointless beliefs thus upheld are not the 
same beliefs as those of proper believers. 
One of the things that this view of religious beliefs means is that faith must 
involve greater decisiveness than the affirmation of speculative hypotheses. For 
one cannot leave the issues posed by existence communications to the facts (or 
the speculative arguments) to decide, while postponing one's working relationship 
to the beliefs in question. The facts, as it were, never speak that loudly, certifying 
the truth or falsity of an existence communication so that one can confidently 
allow the weight of one's life to rest upon it. Religious claims, that is, are not 
knowledge claims; for the possibility of grounding a belief-which applies to 
knowledge claims~oes not apply to religious claims '6 . One can never wait 
until an existence communication becomes a known truth before resting any 
confidence in it. For if there are any such beliefs, they can only be inwardly 
held fast in faith, never known on the basis of argumentative grounds. 
Because religious beliefs require a decisiveness that grows out of inwardness 
or existential pathos, faith entails a transformation in a person's self-understand-
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ing. The objective uncertainty of the issues must be resolved with a personal 
commitment; and this commitment can take only one form--abiding by the 
beliefs that one affirms. This doesn't mean that one has to follow all of the 
practical injunctions of a religion to be a believer. Rather, one's thinking must 
conform to the outlook which the faith represents. 
When Kierkegaard was engaged in a bitter attack on the Danish church, this 
was the heart of his criticism: the Christians which he criticized thought that 
they could express their beliefs without expressing them in their lives. They 
professed belief, but lacked any of the inward changes that one would expect 
in their lives. The problem was not that they sinned by failing to live up to the 
moral ideals of Christianity; that kind of failing is only too common. The problem 
was that they did not think of themselves as sinners, or feel sinful, or regret 
their inadequacy, or do anything that one would expect someone to do who 
thought of himself as a fallen creature of God. "What any religion in which 
there is any truth aims at," he said, "is a total transformation in a man, to wrest 
from him through renunciation and self-denial all that, and precisely that, to 
which he immediately clings. 17. But Kierkegaard's fellow Christians showed no 
evidence of having undergone any such transformation; for the shape of their 
lives was indistinguishable from the life of unbelievers. They did not affirm 
Christian claims by thinking of themselves in Christian categories, by ruing their 
sins and thanking God for his grace, or by reminding themselves of how far 
short they fell of the example of Jesus. Neither their thoughts nor their practice 
reflected the beliefs that they professed. 
By contrast, those who do show their faith in the shape of their self-under-
standing become witnesses to the faith that they affirm. This witness makes an 
impression on people, particularly if believers must make dramatic sacrifices to 
sustain their faith. Kierkegaard calls this the "proof' that is advanced for Chris-
tianity-the fact that believers have suffered for their faith 18. Obviously this 
"proof' has nothing to do with evidence, but the example of such witnesses has 
a persuasive power that helps to make up for the lack of compelling evidence. 
So the faith that cannot be justified objectively on argumentative grounds can 
at least be illustrated on a personal level, where people are moved by the example 
of others whose lives testify to the value of their beliefs. 
All of these points about existence communications could be elaborated further, 
but perhaps I've said enough to provide a rough understanding. Such teachings 
must be brought into relation with mature personal concerns if their import is 
to be appreciatively understood, and they cannot be judged by postponing all 
personal reliance until a convincing case is made for them on argumentative 
grounds. Thus, they require considerable decisiveness for their affirmation, since 
the responsibility for judging them cannot be deflected to the "facts" for a 
decision. The commitment that one makes in believing them should, moreover, 
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entail a transformation in the way that one understands oneself, and this transfor-
mation should be reflected in a person's life. Finally, the power of one's personal 
example in abiding by such claims, filling them out with the substance of one's 
own self-understanding, should provide the persuasive appeal that is needed to 
convince others. 
(2) 
In sum, the distinction between existence communications and speculative 
doctrines is the same as the distinction between "subjective truths" and "objective 
truths." But like subjective truths, existence communications are decidedly pecul-
iar, so peculiar that one might well object to Kierkegaard's point. Perhaps 
subjective claims are not as distinctive as Kierkegaard makes them seem; perhaps 
they are ultimately subject to the same general form of justification as other 
beliefs. After all, if personal concerns are needed to understand existence com-
munications, then why could not such beliefs be understood personally (by 
immersing oneself in existential concerns) and justified like speculative doc-
trines--on grounds. Such grounds would not have to be overpowering for the 
beliefs that rest on them to be reasonably held. Inasmuch as proofs would not 
be available, one would still have to venture a certain amount of faith to believe 
them; but there is no reason why this faith could not be both reasonable and 
personally transforming. 
Nevertheless, I think that this interpretation of Kierkegaard's distinction is 
wrong. Yet it is almost impossible to say why it is wrong by appealing to the 
same concepts that Kierkegaard used. Existence communications are not hypoth-
eses, I want to say. They cannot be left for evidence to decide or to justify, as 
if they might be evaluated in the light of speculative arguments or independent 
evidence. Rather, they are regulative assertions, which playa different role in 
one's thinking about the world. And they are truth claims, despite their resistance 
to adjudication on logical grounds. If all this seems odd to say, it is because we 
have forgotten to notice a familiar category of similar beliefs-principles. This 
is the best way to restate Kierkegaard's view in more commonplace language. 
For in describing some of our beliefs as "principles," we implicitly recognize a 
difference between them and other truth claims; and beneath this implicit distinc-
tion lie many of the same insights which led Kierkegaard to formulate his 
distinction. 
Actually, the term "principle" is used in several different ways, but I am 
thinking of one of its more restricted uses, often indicated by speaking of "first 
principles" or of "fundamental principles '9 • Principles are first or fundamental 
inasmuch as they have a peculiar relation to justification. Because they define 
the form of explanation or description wherever they apply, they resist adjudica-
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tion according to other principles defining other types of relevant evidence. The 
evidence which applies to a principle, in other words, is already conceived in a 
way that presumes the tmth of the principle in question. So the attempt to base 
matters of principle on independent evidence produces only circular arguments. 
Fundamental moral principles, for instance, cannot be justified on prudential 
grounds because the point of the moral principles is to displace self-centered 
reasons for behavior with moral evaluations of it. Thus, one cannot answer the 
question "why be moral" by citing the selfish benefits of moral behavior--one 
cannot do this, that is, and justify a moral principle as such. A fundamental 
moral principle--e.g., the claim that we owe others the same consideration that 
we show to ourselves-aims to override pmdential reasoning with a whole new 
manner of thinking, moral reasoning. And the form which such reasoning is to 
take is defined by the principle itself. Moral reasoning is to tum on the balancing 
of people's separate interests, not on guarantees that a selfish interest is served. 
So the fact that a person may profit in selfish ways by acting morally has no 
relevance for the justification of moral principles. 
This means that believing in a moral principle can only be a matter of adhering 
to it in the way that one thinks--e.g., by subjecting acts of human behavior to 
evaluations based on moral grounds. One who does this shows that he accepts 
the principles on which one's handling of various questions-in this case, ques-
tions about human behavior-depends. One cannot show that one believes, in 
other words, by showing knowledge of the evidence, or by arranging putative 
evidence in the most favorable way. Rather, to believe in a principle one has to 
abide by it; and one has to abide by it because there is no such thing as resting 
the responsibility for judgment on the facts. Factual evidence will not bear the 
weight of the true/false decision, and so one cannot leave questions of principle 
to the facts to decide, nor can one show that he accepts a principle by citing the 
facts which supposedly ground it. This impossibility of transferring the respon-
sibility for judgment to the facts, or of letting the truth or falsity of a principle 
be determined by facts, is one of the most outstanding points of commonality 
in principles and existence communications. 
But the likeness between these two types of assertion does not end there. Since 
one must abide by a principle to believe in it, one's belief must be filled out 
with the example of compliance in one's life. This means that one must confonn 
the manner of one's thinking to the principles that one believes, letting them 
serve as guides for the kind of judgment that one makes. One adjusts the form 
of explanation to the pattern suggested by the principle, and this affects the way 
in which evidence is conceptualized in the principle's domain. Hence, the adop-
tion of new principles, like the affinnation of existence communications, neces-
sarily entails a transfonnation in a believer's thinking. A child who comes to 
accept moral principles thinks in a new way about his or her behavior. A 
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psychologist who abandons the principles of psychoanalysis for those of 
behaviorism alters the kind of explanation envisioned in the study of human 
behavior. And a primitive animist who comes to believe in scientific principles 
changes the estimation of what counts as relevant evidence for the defense of 
natural hypotheses. All these are fundamental changes in outlook brought about 
by changes of principle. 
As for the defense of truly fundamental principles, rather than being derived 
from any more certain premises, they are simply displayed in the thinking and 
living that goes with them. In the lives of those whose thought is transformed 
by them, they reveal their forcefulness by revealing the capacities that attend 
their understanding. One could even say that principles, like existence communi-
cations, are defended by being witnessed, or by being illustrated in vivo. If they 
further one's understanding of problems in the relevant field, reducing the number 
of anomalies by providing workable explanations of existing puzzles, their cre-
dibility will be much enhanced. But there will be no way to convert this success 
into independent grounds for belief, since the success of a principle is defined 
in ways that also presume its truth. So here, too, there is no difference between 
fundamental principles and existence communications: the credibility of both 
depends on the persuasive power of their embodiment. 
This preliminary sketch of the logic of principles should help us to see the 
close similarity between existence communications and principles. But can this 
comparison stand up under closer scrutiny? One of the puzzling things that 
Kierkegaard said about existence communications was that the amount of passion 
involved in their affirmation was inversely proportional to their philosophical 
intelligibility. The more sense that a doctrine made philosophically, the less 
passion it would take to believe it, and vice versa. A doctrine that was wholly 
unintelligible philosophically, or absurd, would arouse the greatest passion and 
require the greatest "inwardness" for its affirmation. Thus, the maximum passion 
required by Christianity corresponds to a teaching that is philosophically sense-
less. The doctrine that the infinite God became incarnate in the finite man Jesus 
is absurdly paradoxical; it resists speculative attempts to comprehend it absolutely, 
so there can be no question of defending this doctrine on speculative grounds. 
To believe in this doctrine at all, one has to believe it in spite of its philosophical 
unintelligibility. 
Is there anything comparable to this in the logic of principles? Are any funda-
mental principles paradoxical? The answer, surprisingly perhaps, is "yes." There 
are principles, and not foolish principles, which cannot be understood or justified 
philosophically; and many of them occur in familiar areas of discourse. 
Consider, for example, the basic principle of Freudian psychology-that is, 
the claim that the human psyche has three parts, the ego, the id, and the superego. 
According to this principle and its development, psychological difficulties are 
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the result of a kind of hiding that takes place between the id and the ego, a 
hiding that is accomplished by the superego. The ego is kept unaware of the 
desires of the id by the superego, but the superego allows the powerful desires 
of the id to be satisfied in a disguised manner, so that the true nature of these 
desires is never realized by the ego. The result is behavior with misunderstood 
motivation--compulsions, obsessional neuroses, hysteria, and so on. In the treat-
ment of people's psychological problems, this theory has had some success. 
Perhaps it has not always informed successful therapies, but I do not want to 
deny the usefulness of Freudian principles altogether. Depth psychology arose 
on this foundation. 
Yet from a philosophical point of view, the theory that the psyche consists of 
three parts, the id, the ego, and the superego, is incoherent. The purpose of this 
theory is to present psychological difficulties as arising from deception. A person 
deceives himself or herself by hiding from view certain subconscious facts, facts 
which can only be expressed in ways which prevent the ego from realizing the 
true content of one's thoughts. The deception involved, in other words, is self-
deception. But the theory itself presents these problems as if they were instances 
of ordinary deception-as if one person, the superego, were deceiving another, 
the ego, about the content of the id. The theory, that is, uses fictitious selves to 
present cases of self-deception as if they were cases of ordinary lying. This 
makes it easier to handle such cases therapeutically, but it fails utterly to explain 
how self-deception is possible. How can one and the same person lie to himself? 
As an answer to this question, the theory that a person is really three persons, 
one of whom lies to the other, is absurd. It does not answer the question at all; 
it simply bypasses the difficulty in favor of providing a working way to concep-
tualize psychological illnesses. 
Thus, one should not assume that working principles must be intelligible from 
a theoretical, or philosophical, point of view. The principles of Freudian 
psychoanalysis are not aimed at abstract philosophical questions, and they do 
not even attempt to answer the purely intellectual question of how self-deception 
is possible. They are geared instead to the business of therapy, and in this 
connection they function fairly well. Perhaps the wave-particle "theory" of light 
is another example; this "theory" functions well enough in the workaday business 
of physics, but from a purely speculative point of view it is exceedingly difficult 
to understand how light can be both a wave and a particle. The mistake is to 
suppose that such principles, if they are to be reasonably believed, must be 
intelligible from a purely philosophical point of view . That simply is not the case. 
The implication of these remarks in relation to Kierkegaard should be obvious. 
The fact that Christianity's claim that God was in Christ is paradoxical-i.e., 
that it resists philosophical understanding-does not mean that it cannot be a 
credible principle. 
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(3) 
Nevertheless, I can imagine someone objecting to this comparison between 
existence communications and principles on other grounds. For principles do 
not have to be edifying in the way that existence communications must. A 
Freudian can be committed to the principles of psychoanalysis without being 
personally edified, or without having his existence transformed in any funda-
mental way. He need not undergo any moral transformation, for example; and 
neither must he change his spiritual outlook as a consequence of adhering to his 
psychological principles. So the adoption of such principles does not seem to 
make any existential difference to a person at all. Yet the principles of Christianity, 
or of existence communications in general, must make a difference. At least, 
they are intended to make a difference, and that is the reason why they are called 
existence communications. Their affirmation should make a difference in the 
way one copes with the existential problems of being a human being, and 
consequently, a difference in self-understanding. 
Without trying to elaborate the differences between principles which are 
edifying and those which are not, let me simply admit this point. Not all principles 
are existentially significant; most of them have little or nothing to do with the 
spiritual problems of self-understanding or personal growth. But this does not 
mean that the comparison between existence communications and principles is 
off the mark; it simply means that existence communications are comparable 
only to certain kinds of principle. Instead of throwing out the comparison between 
existence communications and principles, therefore, we need to say more exactly 
what kinds of principle bear the life-transforming consequences of existential 
communications. 
Once again, the rudiments of an answer can be found in Kierkegaard's pages. 
As he often said, human beings have an absolute felos in life, and religious 
claims are plainly connected with the understanding of this end20 • Indeed, I don't 
think that I can find a better term for characterizing the kind of principles that 
faith involves: religious beliefs are teleological principles. The are claims which 
define one's orientation to ultimate ends, making the pursuit of ultimate happiness 
conceivable. They can be understood, therefore, as claims about the ultimate 
purpose of life, the value of all that is, or the final point of any of our struggles. 
That is why religious beliefs are so often said to concern the meaning of life; 
believers reassess themselves and their purposes in the light of an enlarged 
conception of life's true ends. In so doing, they change the way they understand 
their suffering, for example. Or they change the way they think about their fate. 
These changes are, in effect, changes in the meaning that life has for a person, 
and they follow from the adoption of teleological principles-whose point is to 
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enable just this kind of self-reflection. 
Let me try to clarify these remarks by discussing some of these changes in 
greater detail. Adopting a religious principle bears implications for the way in 
which a person understands and pursues true happiness-his absolute telos, as 
Kierkegaard says. And this being the case, the belief in the Christian paradox 
should entail a changed view of one's prospects for happiness. But surely it 
does. For Christian faith is expressed not simply in the claim that God was in 
Christ, but in the claim that God was in Christ reconciling the world to himself. 
To believe in the Incarnation is to count oneself a recipient of God's act of 
reconciliation; it is to believe that God somehow acted through Christ to extend 
forgiveness to everyone, including oneself. So if people's belief is to the point, 
they will adhere to this aspect of the teaching. They will count themselves 
forgiven. 
Counting oneself forgiven, in tum, affects the orientation which one has to 
his absolute telos, ultimate happiness. Instead of supposing that this happiness 
depends on the fulfillment of conditions, or instead of making self-acceptance 
depend on the satisfaction of requirements, believers take God's forgiveness as 
their right to affirm themselves despite the fact that these prior conditions have 
not been met. They affirm themselves in spite of their inadequacy in measuring 
up to the standards which they set for themselves. And they do this without 
having earned the right through their own efforts. This does not mean that 
believers cease their efforts to improve themselves; the only change concerns 
the way in which this effort of self-improvement is understood. No longer does 
it represent a task which must be completed before one can fully approve of 
himself; it represents a task through which he or she expresses thanksgiving for 
having already received the highest good. Thus, believers reside comfortably 
within themselves in trying to be good people. No longer must they struggle 
with themselves to prove themselves worthy. Their worth, they trust, is already 
assured. God, they believe, told them that in becoming incarnate. 
Happiness, in short, ceases to be an end that one can pursue by manipulating 
means. Rather than being an achievement for which one might congratulate 
oneself, it is thought of as a gift for which one gives thanks. According to all 
prudential strategies for acquiring lasting happiness, this idea makes no sense. 
Indeed, the idea of simply receiving the right to approve of oneself without 
having to live up to any prior conditions is absurd. We tend to think of happiness 
as something which we must attain for ourselves, something which we must 
work at, or earn. So it sounds crazy to us to suppose that ultimate happiness is 
not an achievement for which we are responsible. But such is the foolishness of 
the Christian faith, which will always be a stumbling block to those who do not 
realign their thinking with teachings of grace. 
To take one more example, consider the belief about God as the creator and 
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sustainer of all that is. I think that it is a misunderstanding of this belief to affirm 
it and not to entrust one's own well-being ultimately to God. This is not a 
theological point for doctrinal debates; it is a logical point about the nature of 
the claim in question. For the claim that God in his wisdom sustains all things 
is a teleological principle, and as such it provides a refuge for the ultimate hopes 
and fears of individuals in doubt about the direction and purpose of their lives. 
Believing in God, in other words, means evaluating oneself in a cosmic perspec-
tive. It means trusting in a power that exceeds anything that we know. It means 
thinking in terms of providence. That is the perspective that one inherits along 
with the belief in God. For God, who sustains all things, also sustains the 
believer; and to acknowledge this is eo ipso to bring one's concerns about fate 
under the thought of God's care. Here the point that I want to make is that one 
cannot affirm a religious teaching and not bring one's personal thoughts into 
accordance with the evaluative pattern that it suggests. The reason for this is 
that these teachings are not only principles (to be affirmed as guides for thinking) 
but teleological principles (to be affirmed as guides for thinking about the ultimate 
purposes that make our lives worthwhile). If this were more clearly understood, 
one could not affirm religious beliefs without also accepting their implications, 
which apply to our personal existence, where questions about happiness, just 
deserts, and the meaning of suffering weigh so heavily upon us. 
In short, the fact that the affirmation of an existence communication inwardly 
transforms one's life is not difficult to understand if existence communications 
represent principles governing teleological assessments of life. For in such assess-
ments, various beliefs about the purpose of cosmic life become the means of 
evaluating the purpose of one's own life; various beliefs about the suffering of 
the world become the means of coping with one's own suffering; various beliefs 
about the true end of mankind become the means of grounding one's own hopes 
of fulfillment; and various beliefs about the sustenance of God become the means 
of searching for providence in one's own life story. All these general beliefs 
find their application in the context of individual existence, where the telos to 
which they are all related turns out to be the absolute telos of concrete human 
concern. 
(4) 
I'd like to think that this account of existence communications not only helps 
to make sense out of Kierkegaard, but that it also makes it easier to address the 
complex questions of analytic philosophy which have followed in the wake of 
the Postscript. Though I can do no more than to sketch the implications of what 
I've said, I would like to close by drawing attention to two of the most important. 
One modem question is absolutely basic to the philosophy of religion, and it 
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concerns the logical status of religious beliefs, or existence communications. 
Are these beliefs genuine truth claims, or are they merely "emotive" expressions 
which serve to articulate the passions of those who believe in them? Can religious 
paradoxes be true, or are they simply devices for eliciting certain attitudinal 
dispositions? 
Much of what Kierkegaard has to say about religious beliefs in the Postscript 
seems designed to favor an emotivist account. Attitudinal changes do follow 
from the adoption of existence communications, for such beliefs are supposed 
to reform one's inward life. Yet one can never show that these changes depend 
on the affirmation of truth claims, since the truth or falsity of an existence 
communication is generally not demonstrable. That is why these beliefs are 
comparable to principles-their "firstness" makes them impossible to base on 
prior evidence. But this does not mean that existence communications are merely 
devices for the expression of attitudes, nor does it mean that they cannot be truth 
claims of an indemonstrable sort. It does not even mean that paradoxical claims 
cannot be true. The paradoxes in question could be only apparent, or the belief 
in them could be true enough, practically speaking, to be relied on as a working 
assumption. So for Kierkegaard to dwell on the inward changes that faith entails 
does not necessarily mean that religious beliefs are purely emotive expressions. 
But how might such claims be true? They might be true or false in the same 
way that any principle can be true or false. That fact that such principles are 
indemonstrable, either empirically or logically, does not count against their status 
as truth claims. It does not count against it, that is, unless we are willing to 
allow the same logical priority to count against the cognitive status of principles 
in general-and there are too many principles to allow us to do this. There are 
scientific principles (e.g., the claim that the future will be like the past), moral 
principles (e.g., the claim that we ought not to harm others), psychological 
principles (e.g., the claim that all human behavior is a response to genetic 
inheritance and stimulus-response conditioning), and many others. How can we 
say that all of these claims are pseudo-assertions? Each of them iriforms the kind 
of thinking that follows from it, telling us, in effect, that the world will yield 
insights to those who adopt the perspective which it defines. Thus, the principle 
that nature is uniform tells us that the natural world may be understood by 
pursuing natural law explanations, and the principle that we owe others the same 
considerations that we give to ourselves tells us that human behavior requires 
moral evaluations. But religious principles do the same kind of thing; they tell 
us that the search for wisdom can be furthered by conforming the judgments 
which we make about our existential problems to the standards they suggest. 
This mayor may not be true; but if there is any truth to it, it will be learned in 
the way that the truth of any indemonstrable principle is learned. It will be 
learned, that is, from growing capacitated by a new form of understanding. 
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This shows, I think, how formal the notion of a truth claim is. Scientific and 
moral and religious truths may be utterly different from one another, so different 
that one could not assume that religious truths share any part of their nature with 
empirical truths, for example. Too often we assume that true propositions state 
facts, and that facts contrast with values, so that all potentially fact-stating claims 
have nothing to do with evaluation. But if there are moral truths, then they state 
moral facts, and if there are religious truths, then they state religious facts. In 
this larger sense of the word "fact," factual judgments no longer contrast with 
evaluations; facts are simply the truths which make true propositions true. In 
this sense, and only in this sense, might we say that religious principles state 
facts. But then, the facts that true religious assertions state would be facts about 
the purposiveness of life, about the meaning which the world has, and about the 
sense of worth in which people are able to find themselves. They would not be 
facts of a sort that contrast with values; they would be understood in the same 
formal sense in which truth claims should be understood21 • 
The philosophical concern about the logical status of religious claims is obvi-
ously related to a religious belief's possible justification. If religious claims, or 
existence communications, are not truth claims to begin with, then we need not 
worry about their rational justification. The fact that religious beliefs may help 
people to understand their lives, and to make sense out of their fate, will not 
have anything to do with their truth value. At best, the help rendered by such 
beliefs will consist of therapeutic aid in steadying one's emotions, managing 
one's fears, and living more comfortably in a psychological sense. Some of 
Kierkegaard's interpreters think of this emotional steadying as the subjective 
interest out of which believers manufacture their faith. But if religious claims 
are truth claims, then their affirmation must be connected with something more 
than fear, need, idiosyncrasy, whimsy, or cultural inertia. Their truth value must 
be connected with the way the world is. The illumination, or problem-solving 
power, that grows out of a religious view of life can be taken as the sign of that 
connection. This "power" cannot be turned into objective evidence, but it is 
nonetheless a relevant factor in the judgment of principles, and should be just 
as relevant in the case of religious principles. 
Thus, the fact that Kierkegaard divorces existence communications from objec-
tive evidence and connects their affirmation with subjectivity need not mean that 
questions of faith are to be decided arbitrarily, or in accordance with one's 
personal idiosyncrasies. It means only that logic holds out a place for beliefs 
which are not to be tested evidentially. The mistake is to think that beliefs which 
cannot be tested against the evidence can only be arbitrarily adopted; indeed, to 
think that they cannot be genuine truth claims at all. But there are factors other 
then evidence which bear on the adoption of religious principles. The nobility 
of a religious outlook, the impression made by those who exemplify it, the 
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promise of new understanding which it seems to contain-these are all relevant 
to the affirmation of the principles which underlie it. Most importantly, there is 
the fit between concepts of a religious view and the shape of one's life. Factors 
like these can make the commitment to principles appropriate, even though they 
do not in any strict sense constitute evidence. As one grows more deeply aware 
of the seriousness and pathos of human existence, one becomes more conscious 
of the need to understand life teleologically, and more open to the influence of 
religious conceptions. This deepening pathos spawns sensitivity, and as one 
becomes more sensitively attuned to the deep things of life, he or she may find 
in religious concepts the ready-made expressions for profound sentiments. To 
feel as if the concepts of a religious outlook are ready-made for one's feelings 
is not yet to believe, I know. But it is to have the disposition to believe; and if 
this disposition is not checked by intellectual reservations, it may eventually 
expand into full-fledged faith. 
In any case, the suggestion that existence communications might be understood 
as teleological principles bears two important implications. It suggests that these 
beliefs might be truth claims despite their resistance to adjudication on indepen-
dent grounds, and it implies that there might be more to the problem of their 
justification than comes out in a consideration of objective evidence. These two 
points, I think, need to be upheld in contemporary debates about the nature of 
religious claims. And if existence communications are comparable to teleological 
principles, then Kierkegaard can be read as an ally in this cause. 
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